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Highlights 
 We develop a trade-level measure to evaluate fund managers’ trading efficiency. 
 We build an additive DEA model to focus on adjusted returns during different 
periods. 
 We find that fund managers have asymmetric ability in buying and selling. 
 Trading diversity and portfolio have similar effects on both buy and sell 
efficiency. 
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A Trade-Level DEA Model to Evaluate  
Relative Performance of Investment Fund Managers 
 
Abstract 
We develop a trade-level measure to evaluate fund managers’ efficiency in their 
buying and selling activities relative to the trades of other fund managers.  We 
customize an additive Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) model to focus on 
risk-adjusted returns during different time periods as trade-level outcomes.  The 
model does not consider any input-output process. Instead, it considers tradeoffs 
between multiple outcomes.  We find that fund managers do not have symmetric 
ability in buying and selling.  Some managers do well in buy transactions but not in 
sell transactions while others perform well in selling but not in buying.  We also 
explore the determinants of fund managers’ trading performance.  Compared to trade 
characteristics, portfolio characteristics have a greater influence in explaining fund 
managers’ relative trading efficiency.   
 
Keywords: fund manager performance; data envelopment analysis; trade 
characteristics; portfolio characteristics
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1. Introduction 
          Evaluation of managerial performance is always a challenge even when 
reliable market based information is available for the consequences of managerial 
actions.  In this study, we report on the broad insights obtained from our work with a 
mutual fund company that sought to evaluate the buying and selling ability of its fund 
managers relative to each other.  We customize an additive Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) model to provide the research client an alternative method to rank 
fund managers’ performance and examine how trade and portfolio characteristics 
explain differences in the trading efficiency of fund managers.  We find that fund 
managers do not have symmetric ability in their buy and sell transactions, and 
portfolio characteristics have a greater influence than trade characteristics in 
explaining fund managers’ relative efficiency.  While traditional portfolio 
performance measures focus on performance relative to a capital market model, our 
analysis emphasizes evaluation of fund manager performance measured as 
risk-adjusted returns at the trade level and assessed relative to the trades of other fund 
managers with the company. 
          The literature on mutual fund performance measurement can be traced to 
the beginning of asset pricing theory.  Jensen (1968) and Treynor (1965) provided 
some of the earliest formal measures based on the capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM).  Recent studies of mutual fund returns based on arbitrage pricing theory 
(APT) have moved beyond CAPM-based performance measures (e.g. Carhart, 1997, 
Daniel et al, 1997).  These studies account for different risk factors in the cross- 
section of expected returns, such as size, book-to-market value and momentum.  In 
practice, the Sharpe Ratio is a popular industry standard because it is directly 
computable from an observed series of returns without any additional information 
(Sharpe, 1994).  However, it is based on restrictive properties of estimated alpha in 
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reflecting the overall performance outcome of a portfolio.  None of the above models 
explicitly exploit more detailed information available at the decision-level.  The 
performance of managers of actively managed funds depends largely on their 
efficiency in timing their buy and sell trades.  Wermers (2000) documents that the 
average turnover ratio for some actively managed funds is over 150%, indicating that 
the holding period of each stock in their portfolios, on average, is less than 8 months.  
Our contribution in this study is in adapting the generic additive DEA model to fit the 
context of evaluating fund managers’ performance based on detailed return data for 
each trade.  
In this paper we propose an alternative fund performance measure based 
on the notion of relative efficiency.  Our customized DEA model provides relative 
performance information at the transaction level.  We posit that for active fund 
managers, it is important to focus on their disaggregated performance for each trade 
and explore the granular drivers of their trading performance.  For this purpose, we 
develop our model to evaluate the relative efficiency of each of their trades.  Thus, in 
our model, each trade is a decision making unit (DMU) and its risk-adjusted returns 
for different time periods are the outcomes. 
Unlike conventional performance measurement methods, DEA is a 
non-parametric method which does not impose theoretical assumptions of any model 
from financial theory (such as CAPM or APT) to construct a benchmark.  Instead, 
our DEA model measures how well each trade of a fund manager performs relative to 
the best trades of all managers in the reference group.  This relative performance 
measure provides our research client relevant information to select, train and reward 
fund managers and organize their portfolios.  Additionally, DEA is flexible and can 
evaluate performance on a number of different timing dimensions simultaneously.  
In contrast, the prior literature on fund performance often focuses the frame of 
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reference for evaluation to only one horizon (usually one year) at a time in the 
analysis (e.g. Carhart, 1997).  Accordingly, our measure is more useful for those 
actively managed funds whose turnover rate is high, and the holding period is low.  
Our model has the flexibility to place a greater performance weight on returns in 
shorter term horizons or in a manner that reflects different strategic considerations.  
Moreover, our second stage regression analysis identifies the transaction-level drivers 
of fund managers’ trading efficiency that can help our research client improve fund 
managers’ future trading performance.  Our DEA model can supplement traditional 
portfolio performance measures by extracting information from trades that can 
improve internal management of fund portfolios.   
DEA has long been used to measure the performance of financial 
investments. Murthi et al. (1997) evaluate the efficiency of 2,083 mutual funds over 
one year.  Basso and Funari (2001) measure the efficiency of 47 mutual funds 
between 1997 and 1999.  Other applications of DEA to measure mutual fund 
performance include Morey and Morey (1999), Basso and Funari (2003), Lozano and 
Gutierrez (2008) and Lamb and Tee (2012).  Some recent papers also apply DEA to 
evaluate hedge fund performance (e.g. Gregoriou, 2003; Gregoriou et al, 2005; Eling, 
2006, Kumar et al, 2010).  They pay more attention to different downside risk 
measures in order to capture the tail risk in hedge fund returns.  In contrast, we focus 
on mutual fund managers’ relative performance measured at the buy and sell 
transactions level. 
          Unlike the standard BCC model (e.g. Banker, Charnes, and Cooper, 1984) 
we do not consider a production process relating inputs to outputs.  Instead, we 
leverage the ability of the BCC model to compare performance of an observation with 
convex combinations of other observed performance.  In our model, the DMU 
corresponds to each trade conducted by each fund manager.  The performance 
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outcomes for each trade (=DMU) are measured as post-buy (positive orientation) or 
post-sell (negative orientation) risk-adjusted returns in three consecutive time 
horizons.   
We consider the outcomes of each trade relative to others.  We do not 
model or estimate a production process relating some inputs to some outputs (Banker, 
Chang, Janakiraman and Konstans, 2004).  We build an additive DEA model for our 
study rather than the standard radial model because our observations are returns for 
each trade, not traditional inputs and outputs in a production function, and many of 
them have negative values.  Instead, we model overall efficiency as the weighted 
sum of the efficiency for each of the three outcomes separately, where the weight on 
each outcome corresponds to its strategic importance.  We measure the efficiency for 
each outcome as the slack in the constraint corresponding to that outcome.  Thus, the 
efficiency for each outcome is measured as the additive difference between the actual 
outcome and the corresponding outcome of a virtual reference unit constructed as a 
convex combination of observed outcomes of other trades.   
Our model measures each fund manager’s performance separately for 
each trade at the buy and sell transaction level.  We aggregate the relative 
efficiencies of all buy or all sell trades of a fund manager to measure his overall buy 
or sell efficiency.  Based on this first stage efficiency analysis, we can further 
examine in a second stage regression analysis whether fund managers have equal 
ability in both buying and selling, or how trade and portfolio characteristics explain 
fund managers’ buy or sell trading efficiency (Banker and Natarajan, 2008). 
In the second stage, we regress fund managers’ relative efficiency on 
possible determinants of their relative trading efficiency.  We find that portfolio 
characteristics have considerable influence on fund managers’ relative trading 
efficiency.  The major overall finding of our second stage analysis is that fund 
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managers have asymmetric performance in buy trades and sell trades.  Some 
managers do well in buy transactions but not in sell transactions while others perform 
well in sell but not in buy transactions.  An important implication of this result for 
fund managers’ performance evaluation is that we should consider portfolio 
characteristics (such as portfolio diversification and portfolio size) and recognize fund 
managers’ asymmetric ability in buy and sell trades when evaluating their 
performance. 
          The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  We first describe 
our unique dataset in section 2 and then introduce the additive DEA model we employ 
to evaluate fund managers’ relative trading efficiency in section 3.  We report our 
empirical results and main findings with robustness checks in section 4.  Finally, we 
conclude in section 5 with a discussion of our results and directions for future 
research. 
 
2. Data Description 
          The dataset in this study is at the granular trading level, which allows us 
to closely observe fund managers’ trading decisions in buying and selling respectively 
and precisely measure their performance.  Unlike other mutual fund databases, our 
dataset is at the transaction level.  There are 23,408 transactions in our dataset 
provided by a mutual fund management consulting firm.  These trades are conducted 
by 18 fund managers.  In addition to North America, these fund managers also trade 
securities in Europe, Asia and Oceania, depending on their specialization.  Our 
transactional dataset therefore includes global securities.   
For each transaction, we have its cumulative returns in the periods prior 
to and subsequent to the trade date.  Our research client adjusts returns for risk 
considerations employing a proprietary multi-factor model.  We have returns for six 
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different periods: 12 to 6 months (Pre12-6), 6 to 3 months (Pre6-3) and 0-3 months 
(Pre3-0) prior to the trade date and 0-3 months (Post0-3), 3 to 6 months (Post3-6) and 
6 to 12 months (Post6-12) subsequent to the trade date.  Figure 1 depicts the six time 
periods for the returns in each trade. 
          The primary objective of our study is to develop a trade-level 
performance measure based on the concept of relative efficiency to satisfy the 
research client’s need for granular, benchmarked performance measures.  Our 
relative performance measure considers each trade’s timing of returns in different 
periods.  In addition, we have separate datasets for buy and sell transactions which 
allow us to examine fund managers’ buying and selling activities separately.  Most 
other related studies conduct their analyses only at the fund portfolio level and they 
cannot directly measure fund managers’ buy and sell performance.  For example, the 
mutual fund database, Thomson/CDA, covers the mutual fund portfolio holdings on a 
quarterly basis.  As a result, previous studies using this database estimate fund trades 
by tracking changes in holdings from quarter to quarter.  With our unique database, 
we can directly capture fund managers’ performance in trading for each of their 
transactions.  Therefore we can more precisely measure the buy and sell 
performance of each fund manager.  In addition to cumulative returns for each 
transaction, our dataset includes portfolio specific data, such as the company name, 
trading date, market value and trading price for each transaction. 
          We first filter out transactions with insufficient information, such as 
missing returns or missing identification as either buy trades or sell trades.  Table 1 
reports summary characteristics of the 23,408 transactions that we use in our analysis 
(11,496 relate to buying activities and 11,912 relate to selling activities). Table 1 also 
shows the mean, median, and standard deviation of the cumulative return prior to the 
trade date and after the trade date for each transaction.  The transactions are 
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performed by 18 fund managers over a two-year period. The sample period is not 
characterized by unusually high levels of volatility or extremes of economic activity.  
 
3. Estimation Models 
          We use DEA-based nonparametric estimation procedures to estimate 
efficiency scores evaluating fund managers’ performance in each of their buy and sell 
trades relative to all trades of all 18 fund managers.  These scores differ from 
traditional, portfolio level performance measures that are often used by investment 
fund managers, such as those based on the capital asset pricing model and the 
arbitrage pricing theory model.  DEA modeling in general does not impose the 
assumptions of any financial model to construct a benchmark.  Instead, DEA models 
construct a benchmark relative to the actual performance of other fund managers.  
Buy low and sell high is obviously the best investment strategy to generate profits.  
Analyzing post-buy returns is the most simple and direct way to evaluate fund 
managers’ buy performance.  Analogously, the timing of a sell transaction is more 
profitable if post-sell returns are lower. 
We modify the Banker, Charnes, and Cooper (BCC) (1984) model into 
an additive model to compare these buy transactions’ post-trade returns in three 
different periods.  The standard BCC model is not appropriate in our study because 
our observations are returns and many of them have negative values.  Negative 
values in the standard BCC model confound the correct ranking of transactions’ 
relative efficiency because the relative inefficiency of each observation is defined as a 
ratio of the weighted sum of returns for all observations over the reference set.  To 
address this problematic issue, we modify the standard BCC model to an additive 
model so that the relative inefficiency measure θ captures the shortfall in returns 
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relative to the reference set.  It is not affected by negative values and reflects the 
correct ranking of each observation. 
For each transaction in our buy sample, we have its 0 to 3 month 
(Post0-3), 3 to 6 month (Post3-6) and 6 to 12 month (Post6-12) post-buy returns.  
The 3 returns for each of the three time periods are the transaction’s three outcomes 
(y1, y2 and y3).  Our DEA model for the buy transactions is similar to the standard 
DEA model with three outputs and no input except for the additive efficiency 
structure.  We define the efficiency score to be ηj
*
 = exp (-θj
*
) where θj
*
 is as 
specified below in Model (1): 
                    (1) 
 
subject to 
 
 
 
 
where j and k represent each of 11,496 buy transactions, t denotes the three periods 
after the trade (so that T = 3 in our example), and λk is the weight on each reference 
transaction k.  Thus, for our study, we have returns for three different periods (t = 1, 
2, 3) corresponding to the three outcomes (returns during Post0-3, Post3-6 and 
Post6-12).  Since there are 11,496 transactions in our buy sample, “k” ranges from 1 
to 11,496.  The weights rt can be different for each period depending on the strategic 
importance of returns in each time period based on a variety of managerial 
considerations.  For example, to evaluate fund managers who trade actively, we can 
call attention to their performance in short term horizons immediately after their 
trading by putting more weight on the inefficiency score in the post 0-3 or 3-6 month 
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period.  To disguise the research client’s strategic considerations, we cannot disclose 
the exact values of the weights rt used in our analysis.  We present our empirical 
results using their actual weights chosen such that r1 > r2 > r3 to reflect the relatively 
higher importance of short term returns in the relative efficiency analysis.  We also 
repeated the analysis with all three weights set to be equal; the results reported in our 
subsequent regression analysis are robust to this alternative set of weights. 
For each transaction j, our objective function is to maximize the weighted 
sum of the post-buy returns from all three periods.  This optimization process 
constructs an efficient frontier so that we can evaluate the performance of transaction 
j relative to all transactions k, including itself.  In our buy model, we have three 
positively oriented performance measures (0-3 month (y1), 3-6 month (y2), and 6-12 
month (y3) post-buy returns) and there is no input.  Here θj
*
 is the weighted sum of 
the slacks in constrains for the three time periods for each transaction j.  The smaller 
the θj
*
, the greater are the post-buy returns of this trade j and the higher is the 
transaction efficiency.  Since θj
*     , ηj
* 
= exp(-θj
*
) ranges between 0 and 1 
consistent with the common expectation for efficiency.  Using linear programming 
to solve this problem, we obtain 11,496 estimates of θj* corresponding to each of the 
11,496 trades. The greater the efficiency score, the better has the fund manager 
performed in that trade.  In the following sections, we use the trade-level efficiency 
score ηj
*
 to perform our analysis.  
We apply this method in a similar fashion to evaluate fund managers’ 
performance in their sell transactions.  In fund management, selling stocks at a high 
before the prices decline creates value.  Therefore, we use the negative of post-sell 
returns in each time period to measure each sell transaction’s efficiency.  The 
post-sell returns could also be viewed as the opportunity cost of not holding the stock 
any longer after it is sold.  Accordingly, more negative or less positive post-sell 
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returns mean that greater value was created and lower opportunity costs were incurred.  
We take the negative of post-sell returns for 0 to 3 month (Post0-3), 3 to 6 month 
(Post3-6) and 6 to 12 month (Post6-12) to measure each transaction’s negatively 
oriented outcomes.  Using these three stock returns denoted here by x1, x2 and x3, we 
measure the efficiency of each of the 11,912 sell transactions relative to other sell 
transactions.  We define the sell efficiency score ωj
*
 for each transaction j as ωj
*
 = 
exp(-ϕj
*
) where the following Model (2) gives us each sell transaction’s inefficiency 
measure: 
                    (2) 
 
subject to 
 
 
 
 
 
where j and k represent transactions, t denotes the three periods, λk is the weight on 
each reference transaction k.  We have returns for three different periods treated as 
inputs (Post0-3, Post3-6 and Post6-12), “t” is from 1 to 3.  Since there are 11,912 
transactions in our sell sample, “k” ranges from 1 to 11,912. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
Baseline efficiency scores          
Table 2 shows the distribution of our DEA efficiency scores in buy and 
sell transactions respectively.  We construct two different market value weighted 
DEA efficiency scores for each fund manager, -- one for buy transactions and another 
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for sell transactions – that provide aggregated efficiency scores for each fund manager 
based on his/her detailed transactions.  The fund manager with the highest value 
weighted DEA efficiency is ranked as first and so on.  From Table 3 it appears that 
fund managers have asymmetric performance in buying and selling.  For example, 
fund manager R is ranked at the top in buying but at the bottom in selling.  Fund 
manager P performs well in buying but not in selling.  Fund manager G is ranked in 
the top three in selling but in the bottom two in buying.   
In general, about half of the 18 fund managers have asymmetric 
performance in buying and selling.  Figure 2 displays the degree of asymmetry in 
fund managers’ ability in buying and selling.  The X-axis of this plot is a fund 
manager’s buy rank while the Y-axis is the fund manager’s sell rank.  The 18 dots 
represent the 18 fund managers’ performance in buy trades and sell trades.  If fund 
managers have the same ability in buying and selling, the dots should lie on the 45 
degree line.  However, we cannot find any pattern from the dots and the rank 
correlation between buy rank and sell rank is insignificant.   
Our transaction based efficiency measure also provides insights on the 
determinants of fund managers’ managerial performance.  If a mutual fund company 
relies only on traditional portfolio performance measures which do not distinguish 
buy performance from sell performance, it is likely that they may draw inaccurate 
inferences.  To further analyze the drivers of fund managers’ trading performance, in 
the following section we employ second stage regression analysis to explore how fund 
managers’ portfolio and trading characteristics influence their trading performance 
(Banker and Natarajan, 2008).     
Portfolio and Trading Characteristics Analysis  
Prior research has examined the impact of mutual funds’ portfolio 
characteristics and of fund investment style on fund performance.  Portfolio 
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characteristics such as fund size, portfolio diversification, and fee structure influence 
fund performance (e.g. Dahlquist, 2000; Haslem et al, 2008).  The investment styles 
refer to the stock (or trading) characteristics chosen by the fund, such as market 
capitalization, book-to-market equity value, and prior-period return (momentum).  
Even though both portfolio characteristics and trading characteristics are highly 
related to fund performance, they have different implications for fund managers’ 
performance.  Portfolio characteristics (such as portfolio size) act as the endowment 
of the fund manager that cannot be changed easily or controlled fully by fund 
managers.  By contrast, trading characteristics are decided by the fund manager and 
reveal more information about fund manager’s ability in trading.  In this regression 
analysis we examine whether fund managers’ trading efficiency is correlated with 
their portfolio characteristics or trading characteristics.   
          Limited by information available in our dataset, we examine two 
portfolio characteristics (trading diversification and portfolio size) and two trading 
characteristics (trading frequency and stock’s past performance). The first 
characteristic we investigate is trading diversification.  We construct a measure 
similar to Herfindahl index, which is defined as the sum of squares of the market 
value of stocks traded by the fund manager divided by the market value of his/her 
trading portfolio: 
 
 
  
where SVni is the market value of stock n traded (bought or sold) by fund manager i, 
and TV is the total market value of fund manager i’s trading portfolio.  Therefore 
each fund manager has two HHI indexes, a buy HHI and a sell HHI.  A high HHI 
implies low trading diversification.   


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N
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We analyze the influence of trading diversification for buy and sell 
transactions separately in order to determine whether fund manager’s trading 
diversification influences his/her trading efficiency.  As documented in previous 
finance literature, a diversified portfolio reduces the variance of the portfolio and thus 
diversification is one technique to reduce investment risk.  If a fund manager holds a 
less diversified portfolio, it implies that his/her portfolio has a higher probability of 
generating extreme positive or negative returns.  If a fund manager diversifies 
his/her trading portfolio and follows more different stocks then, it is also more likely 
that he/she identifies more investment opportunities and obtains good trades.  Hence, 
we hypothesize that diversification has a positive impact on a fund manager’s 
efficiency score.  
The second portfolio level characteristic that prior literature documents as 
impacting fund manager’s performance is the relative size of his/her trading portfolio.  
In microeconomics, economies of scale refer to the increase in efficiency of 
production as the quantity of the goods being produced increases.  The increase in 
efficiency in that context is due to the decrease in average costs per unit.  Whether 
there exist economies of scale in the active money management industry is still an 
open question in finance (Elton et al, 2012).  Thus, if economies of scale prevail, the 
size of fund managers’ trading portfolio will be positively correlated with trading 
efficiency.  Since our efficiency measure is the relative score, we use the relative 
size of the fund manager’s trading portfolio (measured as the market value of a fund 
manager’s portfolio divided by the total market value of all fund managers’ portfolios) 
as the scale measure, instead of using the absolute value of the portfolio size. 
Various trading characteristics or fund manager attributes may also 
influence a manager’s observed trading efficiency (Hu et al, 2012).  An important 
factor is trading frequency, which is the number of times a stock is bought or sold by 
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the fund manager.  Frequent trading incurs greater transaction costs.  If a fund 
manager is involved in active trading, this indicates that he/she is acting on good 
information, and the trading profits can cover the transaction costs.  Wermers (2000) 
documents that active funds can beat the Vanguard Index 500 fund.  He shows that 
active fund managers have greater stock-picking ability to cover the transaction costs 
that are incurred.  Therefore, we also hypothesize that active trading is positively 
related to our relative trading efficiency measure.  Each fund manager has two 
measures for trading frequency, one for the buy sample and the other for the sell 
sample.  Both measures are likely to be related positively to trading frequency. 
We also consider the influence of past performance measuring the 
momentum factor documented in the finance literature.  Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) 
find that abnormal returns can be obtained by buying winners and selling losers.  
Carhart (1997) includes this momentum factor as a common factor to explain fund 
performance and documents a positive relationship.  On the other hand, De Bondt 
and Thaler (1985, 1987) argue that stock prices overreact to information and suggest 
that contrarian strategies, buying losers and selling winners, can generate abnormal 
returns.  The two investment strategies, momentum and contrarian, are commonly 
used by institutional investors.  Since the fund managers in our sample may use 
either or both momentum and contrarian strategies, we do not assume that a specific 
strategy is optimal.  Therefore, we examine whether trading efficiency is affected by 
the stock’s past performance without predicting the direction. 
The regression model we use to estimate the relation between trading 
efficiency and the various portfolio and trading characteristics outlined above is 
specified as follows: 
 
jjjiiij
MtTFreqSizeHHIEfficiency   )3_(Re**** 21210
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We perform the regression analysis separately for our buy and sell 
samples.  Our dependent variable is the relative efficiency score of each transaction j 
and our independent variables are each manager i’s trading diversification index 
(HHIi), the relative size of each manager i’s trading portfolio, trading frequency of 
stock j (the number of times stock j is traded by the fund manager) and 3-month 
pre-trade returns.  We also add the 12-month pre-trade return as a robustness check.   
Table 4 presents results from the regression model for the portfolio and 
trading characteristics analysis.  We find that HHI is negatively related to the relative 
efficiency for both buy and sell transactions.  In other words, the greater the 
diversification of the trading, the higher the relative efficiency is.  In finance theory, 
given the same expected return, a diversified portfolio creates better performance by 
reducing return variance.  Pollet and Wilson (2008) document that diversification 
improves fund performance.  Higher trading diversification with higher efficiency 
score suggests that to some extent our efficiency measure can capture information of 
both return and risk.  Since our efficiency measures are positively related to trading 
diversification, this implies that fund managers can further improve their performance 
by their skill in identifying good trades instead of investing in certain high risk stocks 
and gambling for higher returns.   
Relative size is positively and significantly related to both buy and sell 
efficiency.  The higher trading efficiency of larger trading portfolios supports our 
hypothesis that fund managers’ trading portfolios exhibit economies of scale.  We 
also compare the size of our fund managers’ trading portfolio with the size of mutual 
funds from the CRSP database.  The size of our fund managers’ trading portfolio 
varies widely from 10
th
 to 90
th
 percentile of the distribution of the size of the mutual 
funds from the CRSP database. 
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Trading frequency is positively and significantly associated with relative 
efficiency in both buy and sell samples.  This result supports our hypothesis that 
active fund managers act on good information.  Our results are also consistent with 
Wermer’s (2000) finding that active fund management is a valuable skill.  As for the 
momentum factor (measured as the past 3-month return) the coefficients are negative 
but insignificant in both buy and sell samples.  This result implies that a stock’s past 
performance does not have a significant impact on fund managers’ relative trading 
efficiency on average.  Regression results are similar when we include fund 
managers’ 12 month pre-trade returns instead. 
We report some untabulated standard regression diagnostics at the 
insistence of one of the four referees.  We caution readers to be extremely careful in 
attaching any meaning to these statistics because the second stage analysis in DEA is 
not just another simple regression model (Banker and Natarajan, 2008) and properties 
of these diagnostic statistics have not been explored or derived as yet.  We present 
three common robustness tests for ordinary regression results.  For multicollinearity 
diagnosis, we follow Belsey, Kuh, and Welsch (1980) approach.  According to their 
tests, none of the explanatory variables cause dependencies that affect the regression 
estimates.  We also perform rank regression with our data to check monotonic but 
non-linear relationships.  All the portfolio and trading characteristics have the same 
direction of significant effects on the trading efficiency measures as reported in our 
tables.  Furthermore, our regression results also hold after we drop influential 
observations.  All these untabulated results may suggest that the second stage 
regression results are robust to diagnostic checks. 
In Table 4, the coefficients in buy and sell efficiency regressions have the 
same sign and are similar in their corresponding magnitudes.  We test whether the 
coefficients are equal between the buy sample and the sell sample.  The p-values for 
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these tests are shown in the last column of Table 4 (Diff_Buy-Sell).  Since the 
p-values are all greater than 0.10, the coefficients in buy and sell efficiency 
regressions are not significantly different.  This result suggests that portfolio and 
trading characteristics have similar impacts on buy and sell trading efficiency.  Since 
buy and sell trading efficiency scores are not significantly correlated, it appears that 
individual factors other than portfolio and trading characteristics influence the 
asymmetry.  
Finally, we investigate whether trading efficiency is influenced more by 
portfolio characteristics (HHI and relative size) or by trading characteristics (trading 
frequency and momentum).  Portfolio characteristics are factors that cannot be easily 
controlled by fund managers.  For example, the portfolio size acts as an endowment 
for the fund manager because a fund manager at our research site cannot unilaterally 
decide the portfolio size under his/her management.  From a managerial perspective, 
performance evaluation should focus on those factors that managers can control.  In 
our regression analysis, portfolio characteristics constrain the fund managers while 
trading characteristics provide information about fund managers’ ability in trading.  
Thus, we want to know whether fund managers’ trading efficiency is explained more 
by their endowment or by their ability.  We use Vuong’s test to compare the 
explanatory power of portfolio characteristics and trading characteristics in trading 
efficiency.  The results of Vuong’s test are shown in Table 5.  A significant positive 
(negative) Z-statistic indicates that the second (first) model is rejected in favor of the 
first (second) model.  In panels A and B of Table 5, Vuong’s Z-statistic rejects 
trading characteristics in favor of portfolio characteristics.  Vuong’s test suggests 
that portfolio characteristics (trading diversification and the size of the trading 
portfolio) have a greater explanatory power than trading strategies.  This result 
provides insights for fund managers’ performance evaluation.  When evaluating and 
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recruiting fund managers, we should recognize the limitations that portfolio 
characteristics impose on fund managers.  In summary, these results suggest that 
when we evaluate fund managers’ performance, we need to condition the evaluation 
on portfolio characteristics which are the main determinants of trading efficiency.   
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper provides our research client an alternative method to evaluate 
fund managers’ performance at the transaction level.  Instead of using traditional 
portfolio measures, we innovate from the standard DEA modeling literature by 
customizing an additive DEA model specifically to evaluate fund managers’ 
performance in their buy and sell transactions.  Our relative efficiency measures 
recognize the pattern of returns over three consecutive time horizons (0 to 3 month, 3 
to 6 month and 6 to 12 month post-trade periods). 
Our efficiency scores provide evidence that fund managers do not have 
symmetric ability in their buy and sell transactions.  This result cannot be discovered 
from just an aggregate level portfolio performance analysis conducted in prior studies.  
Some managers do well in buy trades but not in sell trades, while others perform well 
in sell transactions but not in buy transactions.  This asymmetry of relative trading 
performance as captured by the DEA efficiency scores represents an important 
advance in the field of performance management in understanding the full dimensions 
of performance of fund managers. 
We also analyze the relationship between fund managers’ trading 
efficiency and portfolio and trading characteristics.  While overall there is no 
significant correlation between fund managers’ buy and sell abilities, their buy and 
sell efficiency are both similarly influenced by common characteristics such as 
trading diversification and size of trading portfolio.  Therefore, we can eliminate 
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these common factors as potential explanators of the asymmetry in fund managers’ 
buy and sell performance.  The asymmetry between buy and sell performance must 
be associated with other individual characteristics not measured at our research client. 
These results bring our attention to promising directions for future studies 
of fund managers’ performance evaluation.  When evaluating and recruiting fund 
managers, we need to focus on those factors that can reflect fund managers’ ability 
and we should also recognize the limitations fund managers have at the same time.  
These findings suggest a fruitful path in analyzing detailed trade-level data to 
determine what drives fund manager efficiency. 
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Figure 1  Six Time Periods for Annualized Returns 
 
For each transaction, we have returns for six different periods: 12 to 6 months (Pre12-6), 6 to 
3 months (Pre 6-3) and 3 months (Pre3-0) prior to the trade date and 3 months (Post0-3), 3 to 
6 months (Post3-6) and 6 to 12 months (Post6-12) subsequent to the trade date. 
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Figure 2  Correlation of Buy and Sell Efficiency Ranks 
 
Figure 2 shows fund managers’ rank for sell efficiency plotted against their buy efficiency. 
The X-axis shows fund manager’s buy rank while Y-axis is fund manager’s sell rank. The 18 
dots represent the 18 fund managers’ performance in buy trades and sell trades. The rank 
correlation between fund managers’ buy and sell efficiency ranks is insignificant (correlation 
= -0.1703 (p-value = 0.50)). 
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Table 1 Sample Characteristics 
 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of the 23,408 transactions (11496 are from the buy 
sample and 11912 are from the sell sample), including the mean, median, and standard 
deviation of the cumulative return prior to and subsequent to the trade date for each 
transaction. Pre12-0, Pre6-0, Pre3-0 represent 12 months, 6 months and 3 months prior to the 
trading date and Post0-12, Post0-6, Post0-3 represent 12 months, 6 months and 3 months 
subsequent to the trading date.  
 
 
 Sample Characteristics (Cumulative Adjusted Returns) 
 Buy Transactions Sell Transactions 
Period mean median Std Dev mean median Std Dev 
Pre12-0 6.50 2.79 29.85 5.13 1.14 29.85 
Pre6-0 2.43 1.06 19.53 0.57 -1.08 19.11 
Pre3-0  0.68 0.23 13.13 -0.55 -1.13 13.09 
Post0-3 -0.04 -0.57 13.55 0.30 -0.47 12.29 
Post0-6 0.40 -1.03 19.36 0.29 -1.62 17.92 
Post0-12 0.84 -2.26 28.57 1.00 -1.12 25.82 
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Table 2  Distribution of Estimated Efficiency Scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Distribution of Buy Efficiency Scores Distribution of Sell Efficiency Scores 
Quantile Estimate Quantile Estimate 
100% 1.0000 100% 1.0000 
99% 0.9993 99% 0.9993 
95% 0.9982 95% 0.9983 
90% 0.9962 90% 0.9972 
75% 0.9879 75% 0.9925 
50% 0.9437 50% 0.9722 
25% 0.7973 25% 0.8636 
10% 0.5540 10% 0.6463 
5% 0.3305 5% 0.4471 
1% 0.0565 1% 0.0854 
0% 0.0000 0% 0.0000 
Mean 0.8478 mean 0.8848 
Standard deviation 0.2145 Standard deviation 0.1894 
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Table 3  Fund Managers’ Rank for Buy and Sell Efficiency 
 
 
 
 
 
Manager Buy Rank Sell Rank 
A 14 10 
B 12 4 
C 11 11 
D 5 16 
E 13 8 
F 3 6 
G 17 3 
H 18 14 
I 9 13 
J 10 9 
K 15 12 
L 16 5 
M 6 2 
N 8 7 
O 7 15 
P 4 17 
Q 2 1 
R 1 18 
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Table 4 Regression Estimation of the Impact of Portfolio and Trading Characteristics 
on Fund Managers’ Buy and Sell Trading Efficiency Scores 
 
Table 4 presents results from the regression model for the analysis of portfolio and trade 
characteristics. HHI measures trading diversification and is defined as the sum of squares of 
the market value of stocks traded by the fund manager divided by the market value of his/her 
trading portfolio. Size is the relative size of each fund manager’s trading portfolio (measured 
as the market value of fund manager i’s portfolio divided by the total market value of all fund 
managers’ portfolios). TFreq is trading frequency measured as the number of times a stock is 
bought or sold by the fund manager. Ret. 3M is the past 3 month return of the traded stock. 
 
 
 
 Buy Sample Sell Sample Diff_(Buy-Sell) 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient p-value 
Intercept (  ) 0.7633*** 0.7933*** 0.3648 
HHI    (  ) -3.6166*** -3.3926*** 0.8401 
Size    (  ) 0.5587*** 0.5038*** 0.5349 
TFreq   (  ) 0.0057*** 0.0050*** 0.1240 
Ret. 3M  (  ) -0.0427*** -0.0498*** 0.9182 
 R-sqr = 0.36 R-sqr = 0.41  
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Table 5 Relative Information Content   
 
Table 5 reports Vuong’s test results of relative information content in portfolio characteristics 
and trading characteristics. A significant positive (negative) Z-statistic indicates that the 
second (first) model is rejected in favor of the first (second) model. Panel A (B) reports 
Vuong test results in the buy (sell) sample.  
 
 
Panel A---Buy sample 
BUY_Competing models Vuong’s Z - statistic  p-value 
HHI + Size vs. TFreq + Momentum 26.85 0.000 
HHI vs. TFreq + Momentum 14.30 0.000 
Size vs. TFreq + Momentum 27.60 0.000 
Size vs. HHI + TFreq + Momentum -4.62 0.000 
HHI vs. Size + TFreq + Momentum  0.28 0.770 
HHI vs. Size  4.14 0.000 
 
 
 
Panel B---Sell sample 
SELL_Competing models Vuong’s Z - statistic  p-value 
HHI + Size vs. TFreq + Momentum 19.58 0.000 
HHI vs. TFreq + Momentum   8.66 0.000 
Size vs. TFreq + Momentum 37.80 0.000 
Size vs. HHI + TFreq + Momentum -1.80 0.070 
HHI vs. Size + TFreq + Momentum  0.60 0.550 
HHI vs. Size 1.68 0.090 
 
 
 
 
 
 
